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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
GLEN F. NIELSEN and ALTA R. 
NIELSEN, his wife, 
Respondents, 
vs. 
W. R. RUCKER and ADDIE W. 
RUCKER, his wife, 
Appellants. 
Case No. 
8817 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants, defendants below, are the owners of a 
motel, a home and a small apartment, all adjoining, in the 
City of Tremonton, Utah. The respondents are the owners 
of a farm, variously described, just north of Brigham City 
on the highway to Collinston, Utah. Both parties had 
listed their respective properties for sale, and fortunately, 
or unfortunately, the same real estate broker represented 
both parties in the transactions that led to the agreement 
asserted by the respondents and to no agreement as claimed 
by the appellants. 
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The court below found that an agreement had been 
consummated and decreed its specific performance. The 
appellants. here seek review contending that there was no 
agreement at all, or, in the alternative, that any existing 
agreement was sufficiently indefinite as to terms and con-
ditions that the parties should be left to their remedies at 
law for damages and similar relief. 
The facts were all in dispute and, as this is an equity 
case~ this Court is entitled to review all of the evidence and 
to determine its weight, its relevancy and its probativeness. 
We are here content to rely upon specific exhibits that will 
hereafter be mentioned and discussed and our references to 
the transcript will be few. And we are confident that a 
decree sounding in specific performance can be shown to 
be erroneous and that it must be reversed. 
As has been stated, respondents were the owners of 
a dairy farm north of Brigham City. It was represented 
to consist of 110 acres with certain water rights, certain 
equipment and certain livestock. The farm was purportedly 
being purchased from LuRoy P. Deem under a contract 
and escrow agreement. The livestock were the subject of 
a chattel mortgage to the Bank of Utah at Brigham City. 
A certified copy of this chattel mortgage was introduced 
in evidence as Exhibit "U". The real estate broker, Peter-
son, testified that Exhibits "E", "F" and "K", among other 
papers, were prepared and were executed by respondents 
for the purpose of carrying out the details of the transac-
tion (R. 63, 64). In order to avoid repetition these Exhibits 
will be more fully discussed in connection with our argu-
ment as to the points upon which we rely. 
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We should also note here that Exhibits "A" and "B", 
either together, or separately, constitute the agreement be-
tween the parties, if there is an agreement. Respondents 
contend that Exhibit "B" is an amendment to Exhibit "A" 
and that the two must be read together to ascertain the 
intention of the parties. Appellants, during the trial, con-
tended that the respondents became unable to perform under 
Exhibit "A" and that it thereupon became a nullity; and 
that it was completely superseded by Exhibit "B". In our 
present view of this matter, these contentions become some-
what immaterial and we now urge that, whether Exhibits 
"A" and "B" are considered together or separately, they 
are sufficiently uncertain that specific performance is not 
the proper remedy. Again, and in order to avoid repeating 
their contents, we will leave specific discussion of these 
exhibits to the argument. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THAT THE PURPORTED CONTRACT, IF ONE 
EXISTS AT ALL, IS SUFFICIENTLY INDEFI-
NITE AND UNCERTAIN THAT IT IS IM-
PROPER TO DECREE ITS SPECIFIC PER-
FORMANCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT THE PURPORTED CONTRACT, IF ONE 
EXISTS AT ALL, IS SUFFICIENTLY INDEFI-
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NITE AND UNCERTAIN THAT IT IS IM-
PROPER TO DECREE ITS SPECIFIC PER-
FORMANCE. 
It has been said that "a contract for sale, mortgage, 
or conveyance of real property or interest therein, under 
the authorities, must be definite, must be certain, and must 
be unambiguous in its essential and material terms and 
provisions. before a court of equity will decree its specific 
performance." 81 Corpus Juris Secundum on Specific Per-
formance, Section 31 (b) at page 486. 
"Specific performance will not be decreed unless the 
terms of the contract are so definite and certain that the 
acts to be performed can be ascertained and that the court 
can determine whether or not the performance rendered is 
in accord with the contractual duty assumed." 5 Corbin 
on Contracts, Sec. 1174 at page 756. 
Referring again to Exhibits "A" and "B", which must 
be held to be the contract between the parties as asserted 
by the respondents, the only description contained therein 
as to the property to be transferred by the respondents is 
the phrase "dairy farm owned by Glen Nielsen and wife" 
and again in Exhibit "A" is the phrase "their dairy farm, 
with all equipment." Can it be said that this is a sufficient 
description of the real property involved'! 
A further look at the other exhibits is even more re-
vealing. Exhibit "E" is the tendered "Assignment of Con-
tract and Escrow Agreement." The respondents' witness, 
Peterson, testified that this was to carry out the terms of 
the transfer ( R. 63) . This assignment has been executed 
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by the respondents and purports to transfer the respon-
dents' interest in their contract and escrow agreement with 
LeRoy P. Deem as to three specifically described parcels of 
land. 
Exhibit "F" was also a part of the details to effect this 
purported transfer of the property. It appears to have 
been executed by the respondents and is notarized by the 
same Peterson, who was a witness for the respondent dur-
ing the trial, on April 6, 1957. It contains the same de-
scription of the same three parcels as is contained in Ex-
hibit "E". Of the utmost importance is the fact that the 
total acreage contained in these descriptions will not exceed 
52 acres. 
Yet the trial court, in his findings, conclusions and 
decree, directs the specific performance of the supposed 
agreement and directs the conveyance by the respondents 
of four parcels of land having a total acreage of approxi-
mately one hundred and eleven acres (R. 26, 27, 31 and 32). 
(Italics ours.) 
Respondents were apparently relying upon an agree-
ment that only required the delivery by them of deeds to 
fifty odd acres. We respectfully urge that the trial court 
had no right to require specific performance of some dif-
ferent agreement and we further contend that this set of 
facts clearly reveals that there was no agreement at all. 
May we again refer to Exhibit "F" and to the last 
sentence in the description which reads "subject to a res-
ervation in the grantors of 1!2 of all mineral and oil rights 
of said property". Admittedly, this reservation was no part 
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of the contract as set out in Exhibits "A" and "B", or 
either of them; and the record was completely silent as 
to any discussion or agreement between the parties as to 
such a reservation. But the respondents tender perform-
ance wih such a reservation. It is again our contention and 
we urge upon this Court that the appellants' refusal to 
proceed further was fully justified. 
81 Corpus Juris Secundum on Specific Performance, 
Sec. 33 at page 488, states: 
"Except where uncertainty or ambiguity has 
been removed or cured by the parties, a court of 
equity will not decree specific performance of a 
contract for the sale, exchange, or conveyance of 
land, or an interest therein, unless the contract des-
ignates or describes the land with definiteness and 
certainty or furnishes or refers to means or data 
by which it can be identified and located with cer-
tainty by the aid of admissible extrinsic evidence, 
such as public records, maps, or other documents, 
and without recourse to inadmissible extrinsic evi-
dence as to the intention of the parties. The con-
tract may be specifically enforced where extrinsic 
evidence is required to apply, but not where it is 
required to supply, the description of the property 
involved." (Italics ours.) 
One other matter is of prime importance. Pervading 
the record and as specifically illustrated at R. 180 is the 
statement of the appellant, W. R. Rucker, that he was to 
assume the chattel mortgage on the respondents' livestock 
and pay this mortgage at the rate of $175.00 per month. 
The tendered Bill of Sale, Exhibit "K", dated AprilS, 1957, 
specifically provided that the remaining balance of this 
mortgage in the sum of $8454.54 was to be payable at the 
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rate of not less than $175.00 per month. It is not difficult 
to imagine respondents' consternation when they discovered 
that this sum of money was all due on December 1, 1957, 
a matter of only months, as is shown by Exhibit "U". This 
clearly was a sufficient ground upon which to declare the 
transaction at an end and to refuse to perform. The trial 
court wholly and completely neglected and overlooked this 
phase of the transaction and made no finding thereon. 
Again, 81 Corpurs Juris Secundum on Specific Per-
formance, Section 34C (1) at page 493, contains the follow-
ing specific rule : 
"In order to warrant a decree of specific per-
formance thereof, a contract must be reasonably def-
inite and certain with respect to the time, place and 
manner of payment or performance." 
And further at page 494 appears the following: 
"Where payment by the terms of the contract 
is to be deferred, but the time of payment is not 
specified, the uncertainty is fatal." 
We respectfully submit that the present case shows un-
equivocally that it was the intent of the parties that the 
time of payment of this assumed chattel mortgage be de-
ferred. The further fact that it was an impossibility to 
defer such payment should be equally fatal. 
Cases dealing with specific performance and its many 
phases are legion, but a case with facts similar to the one 
at bar has not been found. Two recent cases from neighbor-
ing states appear sufficiently in point to permit of their 
citation. 
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The Idaho case of Crouch v. Bischoff, 280 P. 2d 419, 
at page 422, states the rule as follows: 
"A greater degree of certainty is required to 
sustain a decree for specific performance than is 
required to sustain a judgment for damages at law, 
Anderson v. Whipple, 71 Idaho 112, 227 P. 2d 351, 
and an agreement which leaves any of the material 
terms or conditions for future determination can-
not be enforced." 
And in the Montana case of Steen v. Rustad, 313 P. 
2d 1014, the Court at page 1020 said: 
"It is of course well settled that a contract to 
be specifically enforceable must be complete and 
certain in all essential matters included within its 
scope. Nothing must be left to conjecture or sur-
mise, or be so vague as to make it impossible for 
the court to glean the intent of the parties from 
the instrument, or the acts sought to be enforced." 
And this same Court continued: 
"It is also universally held that cases like the 
present one rest upon their own peculiar facts and 
circumstances. Rarely do we find one case identical 
to another, or so fashioned in fact and law, that 
we can say one is on all fours with another. There-
fore we find equity giving relief in one situation 
and denying it in another where the facts seem to 
be, but are not, quite identical. 
"The Montana cases of Long v. Needham, supra, 
and Reeves v. Littlefield, supra, illustrate the propo-
sition that each controversy must be bottomed on 
its own facts and circumstances. This court, al-
though guided by precedent, will not be bound there-
by since each case presents its own peculiar prob-
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lem. Therefore, in arriving at a just result, we will 
not be guided by any one case, but rather will in-
terpret the facts of this case in the light of the many 
cases which have already been decided." 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the supposed contract, 
the lands to be covered thereby and the extent of the in-
terest therein and the terms of payment and the manner 
thereof were vague and indefinite and uncertain. The de-
cree of the trial court clearly proposes to specifically en-
force an alleged contract that neither of the parties had 
agreed to prior to the trial. 
Whether there was a contract at all, and the evidence 
is compelling that there was none, need not be here de-
termined. Suffice it to say that there was a complete ab-
sence of that type of evidence that is clear and compelling 
and a prerequisite to a decree of specific performance. 
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the trial 
court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE M. MASON, 
JOSEPH C. FOLEY, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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